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4THE AUTHOR
Michael Mayer is a doctoral fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, currently researching the 
strategic implications of ballistic missile defence and its contributions to US grand strategy.
SUMMARY
At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, the alliance decided to move forward on the development of a 
territorial ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and explore avenues for cooperation with Russia in this 
endeavor. Substantial progress on BMD has been made over the past decade, but some questions remain 
regarding the ultimate strategic utility of such a system and whether its benefi ts outweigh the possible 
opportunity costs. Missile defense has been a point of contention between the US and its NATO allies, 
as well as between the West and Russia. This IFS Insight seeks to explore the latest developments on 
NATO missile defense, discuss the strategic aspects of the system and outline the challenges and pitfalls 
of NATO-Russian cooperation on missile defense.
5EGGS IN A BASKET: 
NATO, RUSSIA AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
At the annual Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
missile defense conference held in London in June 
2011, the participants carefully tiptoed around an un-
comfortable truth that continues to hinder cooperation 
with Russia on NATOs plans for a territorial ballistic 
missile defense system. Instead, the conference became 
so awash with metaphors that it became a running inside 
joke, with references to duck hunting, bears sleeping in 
their lairs, striped tigers and baskets full of eggs. Most 
oft en, though, were the discussions of the NATO missile 
defense “train”: who was aboard and who wasn’t, who 
might miss the train at the station, what sort of locomo-
tives were pulling the train and the uncertainty of where 
the tracks actually led. 
To summarize, then, it is safe to say that the train has 
defi nitely left  the station due to the unnamed striped ti-
ger, and while it’s clear which actor is actually driving 
the train it’s unclear how many others will help propel 
the train forward and also have their hand on the wheel. 
Moreover, this train runs the risk of duck hunting in 
such an unconventional manner, especially given where 
the tracks are now leading, that it might wake the bear 
in his lair and cause him to miss the train at the station, 
though he may eventually be able to board it at a later 
point – and the train conductors therefore run the risk of 
having all their eggs in one basket. 
Well, that should clear things up nicely. 
For those of you who are still confused, however, here’s 
the crux of the issue in plain text. The NATO territo-
rial missile defense system (the train), being developed 
to protect NATO countries in Europe against a me-
dium range ballistic missile attack from Iran (the tiger) 
and eventually have the ability to counter a long range 
missile attack on the United States, is opposed by Rus-
sia (the bear, of course). The Russians are not convinced 
of the Iranian threat, they dislike the stationing of US 
missile defense assets close to their borders and in their 
former sphere of infl uence, and worry that the defensive 
system will eventually be able to intercept their missiles 
and thereby negate the strategic eff ects of their nuclear 
deterrent. 
The United States and the rest of the alliance deny 
that the system will have this capability, and have en-
tered into a dialogue with Moscow to explore avenues 
for cooperation on missile defenses as a means of al-
laying Russian concerns. These discussions have been 
diffi  cult, however, because NATO refuses to give joint 
command authority to Moscow as part of a truly joint 
system. The alliance instead prefers two separate but 
overlapping and coordinated systems, which the Rus-
sians argue isn’t the best way to hunt for ducks. But 
the uncomfortable truth that only briefl y appeared at the 
RUSI conference is this: these two hunters have had 
their shotguns pointed at each other for so long (and 
in some ways continue to do so) that neither is entirely 
convinced that the other partner really wants to shoot 
ducks – and not them.
Although NATO insists that its missile defense system 
is not intended to intercept Russian missiles, they may 
not necessarily be prepared to give up that capabil-
ity entirely. Neither NATO nor Russia fully trusts each 
other and this makes cooperation extremely diffi  cult. At 
Lisbon, however, a number of countries agreed to the 
plans for territorial missile defense based on the promise 
of cooperation with Russia. Both the alliance and their 
potential partners in Russia now appear to view missile 
defense cooperation as the gateway to a broader Russian 
NATO strategic partnership in the future (thereby putting 
all its eggs in one basket). An enormous amount of po-
litical and strategic symbolism has now been laid at the 
foot of this cooperative project by both sides. But as we 
have repeatedly heard, the train has now left  the station. 
NATO’S PATH TO MISSILE DEFENSE
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued 
for such an outcome in the pages of the International 
Herald Tribune on 12 October 2010, during the build-
up to NATO’s November 2010 summit in Lisbon 
(R asmussen 2010). Rasmussen fi rst discusses the mis-
sile threat to Europe by adopting a conceptual trick from 
6the Bush administration, which dealt with strategic 
uncertainty by emphasizing capabilities rather than 
intent when planning force structures. Rasmussen 
notes that “over 30 countries have or are acquiring 
missiles … some of which can already reach Euro-
pean cities”, but then acknowledges that this “does 
not necessarily mean there is an immediate intent to 
attack us”. This diff use characterization of the threat 
is a result of Turkish geopolitics. Turkey would like 
to avoid aggravating its neighbors Iran and Syria 
– both singled out by the US in its 2010 Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review as rogue states – and voted 
against imposing further sanctions on Iran in June of 
that year. However, Ankara is preparing to build its 
own national missile defense system independent of 
NATO (against whom, one might wonder) and, ac-
cording to at least one report (Bekdel and Enginsoy 
2010), may leverage its consent to NATOs plans 
in order to obtain a more lucrative off er from US or 
European contractors. In any case, NATO painstak-
ingly refrained from referring directly to Iran as the 
threat for which the system is being designed. As 
one NATO offi  cial noted, this was like providing a 
thorough description of the threat as an orange ani-
mal with stripes and a tail, without actually calling 
it a tiger.
STRATEGIC MISSIONS OF BMD
Next, Rasmussen invoked in his 2010 article an 
interesting and recognizable strategic argument by 
pointing out that NATO cannot “aff ord to be held 
hostage by the threat of an attack”. The United 
States has pursued missile defenses in one form or 
another since the 1950s, with its current (and most 
operationally successful) developmental cycle having 
begun half-heartedly under President Clinton and 
with gusto under Bush. The strategic justifi cations 
for BMD have remained fairly constant from the Cold 
War up to the present US administration. Defenses 
can reassure allies of US extended deterrent guar-
antees (and avoid nuclear proliferation among allies) 
as well as reassure domestic populations in order to 
be able to sustain political support for strategic con-
frontations with adversaries wielding ballistic mis-
siles. Defenses may also support deterrence eff orts 
by raising the costs of an attack, reducing its ben-
efi ts and thereby encouraging adversarial restraint. 
Conventional US military threats are also made more 
credible if deployed forces are protected from missile 
attack. If deterrence fails, defenses may defeat the 
incoming missile threat or limit the damages caused 
by an attack. The newest rationale, developed during 
the Bush administration and retained by the Obama 
team, is the idea that BMD may dissuade adversar-
ies or potential adversaries from developing ballis-
tic missiles. Reducing the operational eff ectiveness 
of such weapons may convince states not to invest 
their limited resources in these technologies.
Nevertheless, the primary concern for US policy-
makers remains the possibility of being deterred 
from acting to secure US interests. A 1999 RAND 
study put the issue plainly: missile defense is valu-
able not because “some rogue would otherwise 
launch an unprovoked, and patently suicidal, nuclear 
or biological attack on US territory” but that “an en-
emy regime could threaten such an attack in order to 
deter the United States – and conceivable carry out 
the threat if the United States were not deterred. An 
unprovoked attack is far-fetched; a coercion scenario 
is not” (Gompert and Isaacson 1999). The desire to 
retain strategic freedom of action and avoid nuclear 
coercion, or “nuclear blackmail”, has been a (if not 
the) primary motivation behind all three post Cold 
War administrations’ eff orts to develop missile de-
fenses. The psychological component of traditional 
deterrent threats is well known, even if its eff ective-
ness in what many scholars have defi ned as a “sec-
ond nuclear age” is doubted. Scholars such as Keith 
Payne and Colin Gray argue that states such as Iran, 
while not “irrational”, may be “unreasonable” and 
follow a diff erent cost-benefi t calculus than Western 
countries, whereby the threat of a nuclear retalia-
tory strike may not be suffi  cient to deter. If true, one 
might question the notion that a US and/or Europe-
an BMD system could “negate” any coercive threats, 
persuade an adversary from leveling them or avoid 
situations where a regional actor such as Iran initi-
ated aggressive actions under the assumption that 
it would not be challenged due to its ballistic and 
nuclear capabilities. These are missile defense ca-
7pabilities that cannot be engineered and are wholly 
reliant on the perceptions of those to be deterred.
Many of the participants at the RUSI conference – 
and in the missile defense community as a whole 
– appear to fall victim to a disturbing conceptual fal-
lacy. In order to eff ectively deter by denial a potential 
adversary’s missile capability or the strategic lever-
age conferred by such a capability, one’s own defen-
sive capabilities must be suffi  cient to credibly n egate 
the adversary’s potential missile threat. As Iran 
makes qualitative and quantitative improvements to 
its missile arsenal, the BMD architecture for Europe 
must logically follow suit. The need to construct de-
fenses capable of defl ecting large numbers of Iranian 
missiles launched at Europe simultaneously (a so-
called “raid” scenario), however, fails to recognize 
the utter irrationality of such an attack ever taking 
place. No one doubts that a massive Iranian missile 
attack on Europe would constitute an act of national 
suicide due to the justifi able nuclear response of the 
United States and its allies. While such an event is 
possible – just as the Cuban missile crisis may have 
led to a massive nuclear exchange between the US 
and the USSR – it remains highly unlikely. By plan-
ning for the ‘worst case scenario’ in order to have 
suffi  cient deterrent capability, many missile defense 
supporters appear to accept this scenario as a real 
possibility, confl ating the possible scenario with the 
actual threat. By doing so, they run the risk not only 
of escalating tensions with Iran and Russia, but also 
of burden themselves with unnecessary political and 
economic opportunity costs.
EFFECTIVENESS AND COST
Rasmussen argued in his op-ed piece that the al-
liance was now “able to fi eld mature systems that 
have been successfully tested”. NATO’s Active Lay-
ered Theater Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, 
established in 2005, is a “system of systems” that 
links together the national assets of NATO members 
into a coordinated defensive network. This com-
mand and control (C2) function has yet to actually 
conduct an integrated fl ight test, although a limited 
number of ground tests have been performed. The 
assets currently fi elded by NATO countries in Eu-
rope are designed to intercept missiles lower in the 
atmosphere in the “terminal” or last phase of fl ight, 
and include the operationally proven US Patriot 
(PAC-2 and PAC-3) system (operated by Germany, 
Greece, the Netherlands) and the French-Italian 
SAMP/T system (similar in capability to the Patriot) 
which deployed its fi rst battery in September of this 
year.1 The US-German-Italian cooperative eff ort to 
build a successor to the Patriot system, Medium 
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) has expe-
rienced cost overruns, several programmatic “near-
death” experiences and, aft er 15 years, has yet to 
produce a workable prototype that can be tested. 
The US Defense Department recently decided to 
provide enough funding to complete development of 
the system, but not proceed to production and ac-
quisition.
The most widespread and capable missile defense 
assets – and therefore the most relevant within a 
NATO missile defense context – are maritime sensor 
and interceptor systems. A number of allies have ver-
sions of the Aegis ship-based radar system, includ-
ing Spain and Norway. Other nations have deployed 
similar ship-based sensors able to track incoming 
missiles and provide targeting data to interceptors, 
including the Dutch L-band Active Phased Array 
Radar (APAR). Some of these vessels will be limited 
to tracking and target acquisition functions, while 
others will be equipped with interceptor missiles 
such as the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). In order to 
share the economic and operational burden of ter-
ritorial defense, an idea that surfaced repeatedly 
throughout the RUSI conference was that of cre-
ating a “pool” of interceptor missiles which could 
be rotated amongst NATO members. Until SM-3 
missiles or their equivalents are deployed by NATO 
countries in substantial numbers, the alliance’s 
European members will not be able to provide for 
their own territorial defense. Current and short term 
NATO BMD assets will allow protection of deployed 
forces and bases, but are point defenses and cannot 
provide any overlapping territorial defense. For that, 
8US built and owned upper tier systems for area de-
fense such as the Standard Missile 3 and Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are needed. 
The Obama administration’s Phased Adaptive Ap-
proach (PAA) for European missile defense plans to 
develop and deploy defenses in four distinct stages. 
Phase One, which is being implemented now, would 
cover portions of southern Europe and include the 
deployment of the USS Monterey, an BMD ship 
with the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. In addition, a 
forward deployed AN/TPY-2 sensor will be placed 
in Turkey to improve the performance of these ele-
ments, as well as that of the GMD system in Alaska 
and California. In Phase Two, to be implemented 
around 2015, the deployment of more sensors, a 
newer version of the SM-3 interceptor (the Block 
IB), and the inclusion of a land-based SM-3 facil-
ity (“Aegis Ashore”) in Romania would expand the 
coverage area. By approximately 2018, Phase Three 
would add an additional land based site in Poland 
and yet another version of the SM-3 (Block IIA) to 
expand coverage to all NATO allies in Europe from 
medium to intermediate range threats. By 2020 and 
Phase Four, the fi nal upgrade to the SM-3 (Block 
IIB) would improve MRBM and IRBM defenses, and 
provide a limited early intercept capability against 
the ICBM threat to the US from the Middle East.2
Rasmussen correct observed in his 2010 article that 
coordinated missile defenses tying together alliance 
members’ assets can greatly enhance the system’s 
overall capability, especially with multiple overlap-
ping sensors that can provide tracking and discrimi-
nation data for interceptors. At this point, however, 
there are few assets for NATO to coordinate. Exist-
ing national assets are a patchwork of point defenses 
and sensors that require either substantial NATO 
investments or, more likely, the continued imple-
mentation of the Obama administration’s Phased 
Adaptive Approach. It is only with this contribution 
that territorial defenses can be realized. While the 
Defended area with elements integrated together 
with a radar
Defended area with elements operating 
individually
Figure: The same number of elements acting individually provides a smaller defended area than when
those elements are integrated together with a radar. Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data.
9proposed PAA architecture is attractive for its fl ex-
ibility and adaptability, the transportability of all 
BMD elements in the US European plan (includ-
ing the land-based SM-3 sites) makes its removal 
much easier than the Bush “third site” approach, 
which entailed permanent structures in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The phased approach also al-
lows for the non-implementation of the plan’s later 
stages if political or strategic circumstances were to 
change. The Obama administration has made it per-
fectly clear that it plans to follow through with all 
four phases of the PAA regardless of the contribu-
tions made by other NATO members – and, notably, 
regardless of how the Iranian threat develops.
The Obama administration has framed this Europe-
an PAA as the US contribution to NATO’s territorial 
defensive system. Secretary General Rasmussen has 
stated that NATO is already committed to the cost of 
developing theater defense, estimated at 800 million 
Euros over 14 years. The infrastructure needed to 
connect NATO’s system with the Phased Adaptive 
Approach is estimated to be less than 200 million 
Euros. In this new period of austere budgets, there is 
widespread concern that national governments will 
not be willing to fund the purchase of the upper-
tier systems needed to provide meaningful territorial 
defense. As some have pointed out, the US PAA is 
in many ways “too good”: it provides a territorial de-
fense of European NATO members within a decade 
(provided the development of the SM-3 progresses 
as expected) without any contribution from NATO. 
There seems to be little incentive for NATO coun-
tries to invest too heavily in BMD assets that simply 
add another redundant layer of defenses to those of 
the United States. 
MILITARY BENEFITS OF NATO BMD
The military utility of missile defense can be compa-
red to that of nuclear weapons, whereby its strategic 
and psychological eff ects are much more powerful 
than its operational capabilities. While no one would 
deny that missile defenses would be irreplaceable for 
political leaders in the event of a missile attack – few 
would debate the costs of such a system as a nuclear 
armed missile careens towards Brussels, Rome, Pa-
ris or Oslo – the real benefi ts of deploying BMD are 
found prior to having missiles in the air. Neverthe-
less, the system which will most likely be deployed 
within the next ten years will have the capacity to 
protect European populations, its deployed forces 
and US military assets stationed in the region. In the 
event of a limited nuclear attack consisting of simple 
ballistic missiles without complex penetration aids 
such as countermeasures, missile defenses would 
most likely be able to intercept them before impact. 
The 2009 US policy adjustment, cancelling the so-
called “third site” which would have provided re-
dundant defensive coverage of the United States and 
replacing it with a smaller more mobile system based 
on Aegis BMD, actually improved the defensive co-
verage of Europe signifi cantly. The balance between 
off ense and defense oft en hinges upon quantitative 
advantage. The larger the attack, the more diffi  cult it 
is for the defense to distribute its interceptors eff ec-
tively. With the new PAA, a much greater number of 
interceptors are available and improves the system’s 
ability to handle smaller missile attacks as it can fi re 
several interceptors at each incoming threat (a so-
called “shoot-look-shoot” tactic).
Apart from the obvious benefi t of off ering some pro-
tection to Europe from a catastrophic nuclear attack, 
the deployment of defenses has secondary military 
benefi ts as well. The NATO alliance can feel more 
confi dent when deciding to intervene in a regional 
confl ict knowing that the actors cannot credibly 
threaten retaliatory strikes against European soil. 
NATOs deployed conventional forces represent a 
more credible deterrent threat and a more eff ective 
military force if they can be deployed under the pro-
tection of tactical or regional missile defenses. As 
military forces have acknowledged for generations, 
the sword can be much more eff ective when the 
shield off ers protection as well.
Operational issues relating to command and control 
(C2) have yet to be resolved, however. While it is as-
sumed that the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) will hold operational C2 responsibilities, 
there are legitimate questions as to who will retain 
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ultimate control over the system. Rasmussen and 
other offi  cials discuss NATO’s ALTBMD program 
as “plugging into” the US system, while US offi  cials 
talk about how elements of the PAA signifi es a US 
“contribution” to the NATO system. According to 
Russia’s ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin, the 
US would surely stand at the top of the command 
structure: “you have one button and 28 fi ngers. I 
even know which fi nger will press the button” (Glob-
al Security Newswire 2010). This will undoubtedly 
be the case as SACEUR is always a United States 
military offi  cer. 
Regardless, such issues are always challenging even 
within a US context: missile and air defense respon-
sibilities rest with each regional Combatant Com-
mander and coordinating tactical responses to long 
range missile attacks that cross Area of Respon-
sibility boundaries remain challenging. Given the 
limited fl ight times of short to medium range mis-
siles, however, the timeline for decision making is 
so compressed that launch authority would almost 
certainly be pre-delegated (and thus pre-debated as 
well). Therefore, C2 issues would not likely arise for 
a simple attack of a few missiles against Europe, but 
would be diffi  cult in the event of a salvo launch or a 
coordinated attack conducted in several waves and 
with missiles of various ranges.
The military benefi ts must also be viewed with the 
opportunity costs in mind. Investments in missile 
defenses – especially in an era of tight defense bud-
gets – means less funding for other priorities. The 
creation of defenses, rather than dissuade states 
from pursuing ballistic missile technology, may en-
courage both qualitative and quantitative improve-
ments to missile inventories in order to overcome 
defenses. As potential adversaries may view ballistic 
missiles as a means of asymmetrically balancing the 
conventional dominance of the United States and its 
allies, they may be unwilling to simply give up their 
only available tools for politically infl uence.
POLITICAL BENEFITS OF NATO BMD
Rasmussen argues that missile defenses signify a 
“clear demonstration of allied solidarity and burden-
sharing in the face of a common threat” and “off er 
opportunities for genuine cooperation with Russia”. 
NATO is eager to involve Russia in its missile defense 
project. The Russians have responded several times 
by repeatedly requesting more information: Rogozin 
complained in October 2010 that “when we ask, 
time and again, what the technical parameters of 
this system are, what the zone of its deployment 
is, who the enemy will be and why missile threats 
have not been assessed before deploying anything, 
we never get an answer” (ibid.). Signs that some of 
the political maneuvering had ceased were evident at 
the Lisbon as Russia confi rmed it would stand ready 
to participate in building a common system to neu-
tralize common challenges, which would most likely 
entail separate NATO and Russian systems with a 
means of exchanging data to establish a joint “secu-
rity roof” over Europe. The rhetorical battle resumed 
soon aft er the summit, however, as disagreements 
over the details of a joint BMD eff ort.
The development of regional missile defense archi-
tecture in Europe may alter the strategic context for 
the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe. The 2010 BMDR noted that 
“Against nuclear-armed states, regional deter-
rence will necessarily include a nuclear component 
(whether forward deployed or not). But the role of 
U.S. nuclear weapons in these regional deterrence 
architectures can be reduced by increasing the role 
of missile defenses and other capabilities” (Offi  ce of 
the Secretary of Defense 2010). As Oliver Thranert 
has argued, the assurance value of missile defenses 
may eventually allow the United States to reconsider 
its deployment options regarding strategic nuclear 
forces in Europe. While removing these forces may 
cause concern among US allies, weaken extended 
deterrence and potentially cause some nations to 
pursue their own nuclear programs, BMD systems – 
especially those requiring deployed US assets in Eu-
rope such as ground based interceptors and Patriot 
batteries – may alleviate allied concerns and lessen 
the eff ects of redeployment (Thranert 2009/2010).
Germany is most closely linked to this position, 
11
while France remains adamant in their support for a 
nuclear deterrent capability.
NATO would also benefi t politically from the creation 
of missile defenses, as it reinforces the alliance’s Ar-
ticle Five commitment and the foundational concept 
of European territorial defense. Unfortunately for 
NATO-Russian cooperation, the push from some 
alliance members (including N orway) to return to 
“core functions” is inspired partly by Russia’s con-
frontational posture over the past few years. In any 
case, missile defenses provide another means of 
reinforcing a shared perception of threats and risks 
regardless of the direction from which they originate, 
further intertwining US and NATO security interests 
and deepening transatlantic security cooperation. 
The United States has a security interest in extend-
ing missile defenses to NATO, if only to avoid having 
regional actors such as Iran attempt to deter the US 
from intervention by threatening to attack its allies 
in Europe. The PAA would be an eff ective means of 
continuing US-NATO military cooperation in a post-
Afghanistan era, and keep the United States involved 
on the European continent at a time when much of 
its focus has shift ed towards Asia. Ultimately, then, 
the political benefi ts of missile defense are more 
convincing than any military eff ects of the system.
COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
These political benefi ts for the alliance may come at 
the expense of NATO-Russian relations, however, 
unless some sort of compromise can be reached. 
The Russians have a number of legitimate concerns 
which have thus far not been seriously considered 
by the alliance. As it reduces and reorganizes its 
conventional military forces, Russia has increasingly 
emphasized the role of nuclear forces in its strategic 
posture in order to remain (in appearances at least) 
a Great Power. Missile defenses, regardless of the 
threat for which they are intended, have the potential 
to reduce Russia’s ability to deter potential aggres-
sors or use its missiles for coercive purposes. It may 
be the latter point that worries some NATO mem-
bers, especially aft er Moscow earlier threatened to 
deploy Iskander missiles and target certain countries 
that hosted missile defense installations. 
Russia has asked for legal assurances that NATOs 
missile defenses will not be used against them. If 
the alliance truly is interested in a cooperative rela-
tionship, Moscow seems to argue, than it would no 
sooner consider employing missile defenses against 
Russia than it would against the other two nuclear 
states in Europe: Great Britain or France. Legal as-
surances should be no problem at all.3 But the Unit-
ed States and its NATO allies are not quite ready to 
treat Moscow on equal terms as London or Paris, 
even though they refuse to admit it. Russia obviously 
continues to regard NATO with extreme skepticism; 
its demands for cooperation may be understood as 
adhering to the old adage: “Keep your friends close, 
and your enemies closer”. 
By pressing for a joint BMD system, Moscow per-
haps hopes it can integrate itself in the command 
structure and ensure that defenses will not hinder 
its missile forces. A truly joint system could in eff ect 
give Russia the ability to deny the launch of NATO 
interceptors. NATO offi  cials have recognized these 
possible outcomes and refuse to accept the truly 
joint system demanded by Moscow, off ering instead 
the implementation of two independent but coordi-
nated systems. One could also speculate about the 
motivations behind the continual stream of Russian 
proposals that are almost universally understood to 
be unacceptable to the alliance. On the other hand, 
NATO appears willing to cooperate with Russia as 
long it can continue with its missile defense plans 
without accommodating Russian concerns. Given 
the political trajectory over the past months, the 
prospects for constructive partnership seem rather 
poor.
Secretary General Rasmussen and the Obama ad-
ministration are correct in arguing that if the NATO 
alliance and Russia could come to some agreement 
on missile defense, it would be a “game changer” 
that could usher in a new era of cooperation between 
East and West. But a huge chasm of lingering mis-
trust prevents signifi cant partnership on this most 
challenging project. Arms control agreements are in 
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many ways an easier cooperative venture, with na-
tional control and international verifi cation. Missile 
defense cooperation would entail joint operation of a 
technologically advanced and highly sensitive weap-
ons system. Some observers have expressed con-
cerns that NATO appears to be positioning missile 
defense cooperation as the bridge to future coopera-
tive eff orts. It may be a bridge too far.
CONCLUSION
The US and its NATO allies will likely be able to 
construct a networked missile defense system that 
is eff ective against a smaller number of simple 
threats, though salvo launches will likely result in 
some “leaks”. European NATO countries will likely 
make token contributions, mostly as a second layer 
of defensive capability underneath the US funded 
and controlled upper tier system based on the SM-3 
and THAAD systems. The C2 structure will likely 
emphasize pre-delegated launch authorization with 
an American at the top of the command chain. The 
military and strategic benefi ts will remain debatable 
unless a regiona l power such as Iran threatens or 
carries out a suicidal ballistic missile attack on Euro-
pean soil. The political benefi ts have the potential to 
be far more convincing, dependent on the outcome 
of NATO discussions with Russia. Whether these 
benefi ts are worth the political and economic price 
tag remain to be seen.
ENDNOTES
1 Earlier versions of the Patriot system had very mixed results in the 1991 Gulf War. The later PAC-2 and PAC-3 
versions have improved and were much more successful in the 2003 Iraqi invasion, though they also were respon-
sible for several blue-on-blue incidents, including one that resulted in the loss of a British fi ghter.
2 This Phased Adaptive Approach will also be applied in East Asia and the Middle East, eventually constituting a 
globally networked missile defense architecture. 
3 At the London conference, this argument was also used to dismiss Russian calls for legal assurances. In eff ect, 
the idea of NATO worrying about Russian missiles is so ludicrous that legal assurances are meaningless. When 
expressed only minutes apart from an acknowledgement that Eastern European countries obviously are eager to 
host US missile defense installations as a means of hedging against a threat from Russia, however, such dismissive 
arguments seem disingenuous.
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